Contextual Factors Explain Risk-Seeking Preferences in Rhesus Monkeys by Sarah R. Heilbronner & Benjamin Y. Hayden
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 01 February 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00007
Contextual factors explain risk-seeking preferences in
rhesus monkeys
Sarah R. Heilbronner 1* and BenjaminY. Hayden2
1 Department of Pharmacology and Physiology, University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, NY, USA
2 Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Center for Visual Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
Edited by:
Kerstin Preuschoff, École
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne,
Switzerland
Reviewed by:
Naoshige Uchida, Harvard University,
USA
Veit Stuphorn, Johns Hopkins
University, USA
*Correspondence:
Sarah R. Heilbronner , Department of
Pharmacology and Physiology,
University of Rochester Medical
Center, 601 Elmwood Avenue, Box
711, Rochester, NY 14642, USA.
e-mail: sarah.heilbronner@gmail.com
In contrast to humans and most other animals, rhesus macaques strongly prefer risky
rewards to safe ones with similar expected value. Why macaques prefer risk while other
animals typically avoid it remains puzzling and challenges the idea that monkeys provide
a model for human economic behavior. Here we argue that monkeys’ risk-seeking prefer-
ences are neither mysterious nor unique. Risk-seeking in macaques is possibly induced by
specific elements of the tasks that have been used to measure their risk preferences.The
most important of these elements are (1) very small stakes, (2) serially repeated gambles
with short delays between trials, and (3) task parameters that are learned through expe-
rience, not described verbally. Together, we hypothesize that these features will readily
induce risk-seeking in monkeys, humans, and rats. Thus, elements of task design that are
often ignored when comparing studies of risk attitudes can easily overwhelm basal risk
preferences. More broadly, these results highlight the fundamental importance of under-
standing the psychological basis of economic decisions in interpreting preference data and
corresponding neural measures.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Kacelnik and Bateson published a comprehensive review
of the literature on animal risk preferences (Kacelnik and Bateson,
1996). They reported that, across 59 different studies, the major-
ity of animals exhibited risk-averse preferences during gambles
for food rewards. This pattern is generally concordant with the
observation that humans are risk-averse for gains across a broad
variety of contexts (Bernoulli, 1954/1738; Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Here, risk is operationalized as the uncertainty in the possi-
ble outcomes of a decision, and can be mathematically specified as
coefficient of variation (Weber et al., 2004). This usage is distinct
from the everyday usage of the term, which is often synonymous
with threat and necessarily involves the possibility of loss. The cor-
respondence between human and animal data suggests that risk
attitudes are evolutionarily ancient and are robustly stable across
conditions (Chen et al., 2006). These results also tacitly endorse
the validity of animal models for studies of risk preferences, and
provide a foundation for neuroeconomic studies of risky choice
(Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Fiorillo et al., 2003; McCoy and Platt,
2005).
In 2005, McCoy and Platt published the first study of the single-
neuron correlates of risky choice (McCoy and Platt, 2005). In
contrast to the large body of animal studies reviewed by Kacel-
nik and Bateson, they found reliable risk-seeking behavior in
two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Given a choice between
a medium-sized squirt of cherry juice and a risky option that
offered a 50% chance a large amount of juice and a 50% chance of
a small amount, the monkeys reliably preferred the risky option,
even though the expected values of the two options were matched.
As the size of the large and small reward diverged, and risk level
of the risky option thus increased, monkeys became even more
risk-seeking. These monkeys even continued to prefer the risky
option in a control experiment where the probability of winning
was only 1/3 and the mathematical expected value of the gamble
was lower than that of the safe option (McCoy and Platt, 2005).
These risk-seeking preferences were not due to lack of training:
the monkeys consistently chose to gamble even after months of
experience with the task.
Since this early study, it has become clear that strong risk-
seeking preferences are not unusual in macaques. The original
monkeys continued to exhibit risk-seeking behavior for years, and
six others from the same lab were consistently risk-seeking, totaling
eight animals and hundreds of thousands of trials, with no cases
of risk-aversion observed (Hayden and Platt, 2007; Hayden et al.,
2008a,b, 2010; Long et al., 2009; Watson et al., 2009; Heilbronner
et al., 2011). At least two other neurophysiology labs have also
found reliable risk-seeking behavior in rhesus macaques (O’Neill
and Schultz, 2010; So and Stuphorn, 2010). To our knowledge, no
published study has reported stable risk-aversion in rhesus mon-
keys. With a variety of laboratories reporting the same result, one
might conclude that risk-seekingness is some generalizable pref-
erence of rhesus macaques – perhaps distinguishing them from
humans and other animals.
Here we argue the opposite: rhesus monkeys are not unique
among animals, nor are they even inherently risk-seeking. Instead,
we argue that, for practical reasons, the task design elements used
by scientists who have studied risk attitudes in monkeys are those
most likely to encourage risk-seeking. The most important of these
elements are (1) decisions have very small stakes, a squirt or two of
juice, (2) decisions are repeated hundreds or thousands of times
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with short delays (a few seconds) between trials, and (3) the reward
structure of the task is learned through experience, rather than
explained through language. These elements were preserved across
studies in several laboratories in large part because they are opti-
mal for neurophysiological recording, and they show up in rhesus
macaque studies because monkeys are generally trained to gamble
for the purpose of neuronal recording studies. Although the many
studies listed above varied considerably from the original McCoy
and Platt experiment, for example, by use of priming stimuli (Wat-
son et al., 2009) and changes in cue presentation (Hayden et al.,
2010), they still had the core features in common.
CONVEX UTILITY CURVES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN
RISK-SEEKING IN MACAQUES
Before we address the factors that promote risk-seeking, it is help-
ful to discuss the most common explanation for risk-aversion or
seeking: that risk-sensitive decision-makers have non-linear utility,
and animals seek to maximize expected utility. Since the eighteenth
century, it has been argued that decision-makers weight veridical
reward values by a personal utility function, and these utilities, dis-
counted by probability, are combined to form an expected utility
(Bernoulli, 1954/1738). Thus, a concave utility curve, in which the
marginal utility of each additional reward unit diminishes, is often
assumed to explain human risk-aversion (Figure 1). These argu-
ments are restricted to the domain of gains; for losses,hypothesized
convex utility curves may explain risk-seekingness (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Indeed, in his commentary on the original
macaque study (McCoy and Platt, 2005); Lee (2005) pointed out
that the rhesus macaques’ behavior was consistent with a convex
utility curve in the gains domain. However, while utility curves can
describe risk preferences, it remains unclear whether they provide
an accurate process model that explains risk preferences.
We performed an experiment to investigate this question. We
gave macaques a choice between two options, (1) a standard risky
option with a 50/50 chance of a large and small juice reward and
(2) an alternating option that provided either the large or small
reward; its value alternated between these two reward sizes each
time it was chosen (Hayden et al., 2008a). If non-linear utility
functions drive risk-seeking preferences, then monkeys should be
indifferent to risky and alternating options because the utilities
must be the same. Instead we found that monkeys strongly and
stably preferred risky options to alternating ones (Figure 2), indi-
cating that the uncertainty itself biases the monkeys toward the
risky option. In contrast, the alternating option was only weakly
preferred to the safe option, suggesting that non-linearities in the
utility function account for a small amount of risk attitudes.
Another utility-based account often used to explain risk-
seeking, the energy budget rule, comes from foraging theory
(Caraco et al., 1980; Caraco, 1981; Stephens and Krebs, 1986).
The energy budget rule postulates that foraging animals should be
risk-seeking if a large outcome means survival but the (ironically
named) safe option means death. That is, if the minimum num-
ber of calories necessary to survive lies somewhere between the
value of the safe option and the value of winning from the risky
option, an animal should choose the risky option. It is theoreti-
cally possible that this preference, imbued by natural selection, is
so strong that it affects monkeys in the laboratory, even though
they are never even close to mortal danger. Although this is an
appealing explanation for risk-seeking, is it highly unlikely to apply
to gambling macaques. First, if the minimum number of calories
necessary to survive lies somewhere between the value of losing
from the risky option and the value of the safe option, the animal
should always be risk-averse, not risk-seeking. Macaques are not
limited to a single decision, but instead face hundreds or thousands
of gambling choices every day. As the number of trials performed
in a day increases, even when it is only into the double digits (and
even more so beyond that), the optimal risk-sensitive foraging
strategy rapidly comes to approximate risk neutrality. Consistent
with this, satiety level (whether within a session or between ses-
sions) does not affect risk preferences (Hayden, McCoy, and Platt,
unpublished data). Thus, the criteria for the energy budget rule
are quite strict, and, not surprisingly, there is inconsistent empir-
ical evidence of risk-seeking behavior based on energy budget
(Kacelnik and Bateson, 1997).
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT RISK ATTITUDES
Given the failure of traditional utility-based explanations, we next
consider the possibility that specific contexts used in studying risk
attitudes in monkeys influenced their preferences. Because these
tasks were all originally developed for use in single unit physiology,
studies of macaque gambling behavior are subject to unique con-
straints among the corpus of human and animal risk studies. They
involve small stakes (to increase the number of trials performed in
a session), a large number of trials (averaging neuronal responses
over trials reduces the noise that comes from variability in neu-
ronal firing patterns) presented very quickly (because neuronal
isolation is unstable, physiologists collect data as quickly as pos-
sible), and task structures learned through experience (because
monkeys have no language). We consider each of these factors
here.
SMALL STAKES
In humans, risk-aversion is weaker when the reward stakes are
small (Holt and Laury, 2002; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010). Nobel-prize
winning economist Markowitz, for example, intuited that typically
risk-averse humans would prefer a lottery offering a 10% chance
of $1 over a guaranteed 10 cents (Markowitz, 1952). Empirical
tests of this bias, known as the “peanuts effect,” have demon-
strated markedly reduced risk-aversion for small stakes (Hershey
and Shoemaker, 1980; Green et al., 1999; Weber and Chapman,
2005). Some studies even suggest that small stakes may be sufficient
to promote risk-seeking, although this is not fully demonstrated
(Weber and Chapman, 2005). Consistent with this idea, some
have argued that casinos effectively increase risk-seeking behavior
among gamblers by dividing gambles into small (peanut-sized)
amounts (Simmons and Novemsky, 2008). The reasons for the
peanuts effect remains unclear, although it may reflect changing
attitudes to disappointment for small amounts. Another possi-
bility is that when reward sizes are small, gains loom larger than
losses (Harinck et al., 2007). Indeed, there is some evidence that
monkeys’ behavioral adjustments are more strongly motivated by
the possibility of gains (or large rewards) than fear of losses (or
small rewards) in their small-stakes gambling paradigms (Hay-
den and Platt, 2007; Hayden et al., 2008a), despite the well-known
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic of standard utility curve argument for
risk-aversion (left) and risk-seeking (right). Decision-makers are assumed
to have a non-linear shaped utility curve. When evaluating a gamble,
decision-makers will utilize the computed expected utility rather than the
expected value. With concave (or convex) utility curves, the expected utility is
lower (higher) than the expected value. While utility functions are undoubtedly
non-linear, it remains unclear whether the utility curve argument is sufficient
to explain the range of risk preferences in macaques.
FIGURE 2 | Preferences for risky options over alternating ones are inconsistent with the standard utility curve argument. Left: plot of preferences for
risky (unpredictable) and alternating (predictable) options offering the same pairs of outcomes. Right: plot of preferences for alternating (predictable) and safe
(fixed) options. Adapted from Hayden et al. (2008a).
phenomenon of loss aversion for normal-sized amounts (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981).
Regardless of the psychological cause, it is clear that risk-
aversion weakens greatly when stakes are very low. Primate gam-
bling studies invariably use very small stakes – typically 0.1–0.3 ml
of fluid per trial. The average daily intake for laboratory mon-
keys is generally around 2000 times greater than this amount.
For the purpose of comparison, let us consider the human mon-
etary equivalent. If an average American earns approximately
$40,000 per year, or about $120 per day, the equivalent trial would
offer 1/2000 of that amount, or 6 cents, lower than Markowitz’
“peanuts” amount. Although money and juice may not be directly
comparable, it is safe to conclude that each individual trial offers
such a small amount of juice that it probably puts monkeys into
the domain of peanuts effects, and likely biases the monkeys away
from risk-aversion and potentially toward risk-seeking.
Reward sizes in other animal studies run the gamut from small
to large, and are of course difficult to equate to juice and money.
For example, Abreu and Kacelnik (1999) gave starlings access to
an average of 0.085 g of food crumbs on each trial, 0.4% of their
average daily intake. This is four to eight times greater than the
equivalent average monkey reward. In contrast, Kagel et al. (1986)
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FIGURE 3 | Risk-seekingness of two macaques as a function of delay
between trials. Our observations indicate that inter-trial interval has a large
effect on risk preferences. As delay between trials increases (horizontal
axis), propensity to choose risky option (vertical axis) declines. When delay
between trials reaches 90 s, monkeys are risk-neutral. These observations
highlight the strong effect that rapid serial presentation of gambles has on
promoting risk-seeking preferences. Adapted from (Hayden and Platt, 2007).
gave rats approximately 0.2 ml of water per trial, which represents
4% of daily intake, an order of magnitude greater. Future studies
using similar energy budget condition and trial structures should
vary reward amounts and values directly, allowing for direct assess-
ment of how much variability in risk preferences can be attributed
to reward size. Nevertheless, Craft et al. (2011) demonstrated that
rats are more risk-seeking when reward quality is low, matching
the pattern from the human literature.
REPEATED GAMBLES
In a classic paper, Samuelson (1963) described a cafeteria meeting
in which he offered his lunchtime companion a 50/50 gamble with
two possible outcomes: winning $100 or losing $50. The possibly
fictional colleague said he would reject the offer but would take
it if it were repeated 100 times. Samuelson proceeded to mathe-
matically prove the irrationality of this pair of preferences. Despite
the attendant irrationality, the lure of serialization, which allows
one to amortize one’s losses, is psychologically strong. Even upon
being explained of its irrationality, many people persist in this set
of preferences (Lopes, 1981). More generally, many researchers
have found that serialization makes many types of gambles more
attractive (Weaver, 1963; Lopes, 1981; Keren and Wagenaar, 1987;
Wedell and Bockenholt, 1990; Hayden and Platt, 2009b). Prefer-
ences in repeated gambles often move toward risk neutrality (from
risk-aversion for unique gambles), or even toward risk-seeking. In
other cases, repeated gambles may elicit preferences that more
closely match expected values (Keren and Wagenaar, 1987).
Interestingly, the frequency at which gambles are presented may
impact preferences in a similar way, perhaps because frequency is
good proxy for number of iterations. We tested this by measur-
ing risk preferences in macaques in different blocks in which the
delay between trials was controlled systematically (Hayden and
Platt, 2007). When the inter-trial interval is lengthened from a
few seconds to dozens of seconds, monkeys become significantly
less risk-seeking (Figure 3). In our study, when the delay reached
90 s, the longest value tested, monkeys were risk-neutral. We spec-
ulate that delay affects the relative attention paid to the possibility
of winning and losing, and that this change in attention affects
preferences. Specifically, we developed a model in which monkeys
estimated the expected time of the next large reward (and thus,
in essence, differentially attended to winning) and then chose the
option that would maximize the discounted value of the sequence
leading to the large reward. (A control experiment confirmed that
monkeys did not simply forget task details between trials). These
results argue strongly for the importance of serial presentation of
gambles on risk preferences, and more generally confirm the pow-
erful importance of seemingly irrelevant details, like inter-trial
interval, on gambling behaviors.
Another element of serial gambles that influences preferences is
a strong bias toward adjusting behavior in response to recent out-
comes (Barron and Erev, 2003; Hayden et al., 2008b). Gambling
humans are susceptible to recency biases, including the hot-hand
fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy. The hot-hand fallacy is the irra-
tional belief that wins typically follow wins (Gilovich et al., 1985).
Monkeys appear to be susceptible to the hot-hand fallacy, a pat-
tern known in primate gambling studies as the win-stay lose-shift
bias (Barraclough et al., 2004; Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Hayden
et al., 2008b). That is, following a winning outcome, monkeys are
more likely to choose the risky option again than if they have just
experienced a loss (Figure 4). (The gambler’s fallacy, which has
not been observed in monkeys, would have them predict that
wins are “due” and thus more likely after a loss.) In addition,
monkeys change their strategy based on surprisingness, mean-
ing positive or negative deviation in outcome from expectation.
Even though trials are independent, an unexpected outcome biases
monkeys toward choosing the inferior option on the subsequent
trial (Hayden et al., 2011). These changes in preference based on
recent outcomes are large and robust; they can only be eliminated
with extensive training (Lee et al., 2005). While this effect does
not, by itself, explain risk-seeking, it demonstrates the importance
of recent context, and not just present offer values, in govern-
ing preferences (see above and Haruvy et al., 2001; Hayden et al.,
2008a).
As with reward amounts, ITIs and numbers of trials differ across
animal studies. Even so, on average, the number of trials seems to
be lower than in the monkey gambling studies, and the ITIs seem
to be considerably longer. In the same starling study mentioned
above (Abreu and Kacelnik, 1999), subjects did 36 trials per session,
two sessions per day. The ITI was variable, but averaged 57.5 s. In
the rat study (Kagel et al., 1986), the ITI was 146 s and subjects
completed 17–41 trials per day. These numbers contrast drasti-
cally with monkeys’ hundreds to thousands of trials per day with
ITIs of a few seconds. Clearly these are very different experimental
environments, and may account for cross-species discrepancies.
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FIGURE 4 | Preferences in gambling task depend on recent outcomes. Left: likelihood of switching from risky to safe strategy depends on outcome of
previous trial. Right: preference depends on the outcomes of the five most recent gambles. Adapted from (Hayden et al., 2008b).
FEEDBACK-BASED LEARNING PROMOTES RISK-SEEKING
In most studies measuring risk attitudes in humans, the subject
learns about probabilities and rewards through written (or spo-
ken) description rather than through experience. It is assumed
that results from these studies have predictive validity to con-
texts in which gamble parameters are learned through experience.
However, studies using repeated gambles in which contingencies
must be learned from experience elicit strikingly different pref-
erence patterns in humans. Ido Erev and colleagues have shown
that when humans rely on feedback instead of descriptions to
learn about outcomes, they can become risk-neutral or even risk-
seeking in the gains domain (and risk-averse for losses; Barron
and Erev, 2003). The reasons for this discrepancy are currently
unresolved (and reviewed in detail in Hertwig and Erev, 2009).
One possibility is that subjects use overly small sample sizes in
estimating probabilities; another is that they overweight low prob-
abilities, as in prospect theory. Additional possible explanations
include the recency bias observed in estimates based on memory,
and biased mental sampling. Regardless of the ultimate cause, the
fact that decisions from experience produce systematic biases is
well-established (Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig and Erev, 2009).
Another factor that applies to experienced gambles, but not
described ones, is information-seeking. In volatile environments,
decision-makers will mix two simple strategies: exploitation
(selecting the option thought to provide a greater expected value)
and exploration (selecting the more uncertain – and thus more
informative – option; Daw et al., 2006; Pearson et al., 2009). Indeed,
in a dynamic foraging environment, monkeys and humans both
have strong propensities to explore, routinely sacrificing rewards
for the possibility to try new, more uncertain options (Daw et al.,
2006; Pearson et al., 2009). In completely stable environments
like those used in laboratory gambling studies in rhesus mon-
keys, exploratory sampling is theoretically unnecessary (and in
fact costly); nevertheless, some baseline level of exploration may
be innate, or perhaps the decision-maker assumes some inher-
ent variability despite evidence to the contrary. Confirming the
strong drive toward curiosity, monkeys will pay a premium to
have uncertainty resolved earlier in the trial (Bromberg-Martin
and Hikosaka, 2009). This drive for information may bias mon-
keys toward a risk-seeking strategy because choosing the risky
option provides greater information about the range of possible
outcomes in the environment than the safe one.
CONCLUSIONS: VALIDITY AND APPLICABILITY TO OTHER
CONTEXTS
We have identified three major features that may promote risk-
seeking in rhesus monkeys: small stakes, repeated gambles, and
learning from feedback. Preferences for risk are strongly depen-
dent on these task parameters, and all published studies of risk
attitudes in rhesus macaques have in common the three elements
mentioned above. Future studies should directly manipulate these
elements in isolation, thus testing the hypothesis that they are
responsible for promoting macaque risk-seeking. This is not an
exhaustive list of the psychological influences on risk-seeking;
other factors that influence risk attitudes in monkeys include
social milieu (Watson et al., 2009), background context (So and
Stuphorn, 2010), and mood (Long et al., 2009).
The common features of task design in these studies suggest
that risk-seeking preferences observed in macaques may not be
an innate trait of their species. Indeed, recent studies optimized
for physiology in rats have found risk-seeking preferences as well
(Roitman and Roitman, 2010). In a similar vein, we have shown
that when humans gamble in a paradigm designed to mimic, as
closely as possible, that experienced by monkeys, risk-aversion dis-
appears, and humans approach risk-seeking – and also show the
same types of trial-to-trial hot-hand-like effects as monkeys do
(Hayden and Platt, 2009a). In this study, we asked our human
study participants to sit alone in an anechoic chamber with a
juice tube placed in their mouth delivering squirts of juice in
response to individual decisions in a task in which all rules were
learned through experience. (Indeed, it was the same task used
with monkeys, with the exception that humans used a keyboard
rather than eye movements to signal their decisions). We speculate
that if the study participants had been exposed to the same task
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for weeks and weeks, as the monkeys are, they may have become
risk-seeking. These results are consistent with the observation that
when humans and animals are placed in similar conditions, they
exhibit similar gambling preferences (Weber et al., 2004). Thus,
although there may be a main effect of species on risk attitudes
(Heilbronner et al., 2008), it is likely to be overwhelmed by con-
textual factors when experimental conditions are not carefully
standardized.
How do we reconcile these results with the pronounced risk-
aversion observed in other animal species? Certainly, most animals
are risk-averse (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996), although there are
now many known exceptions (for a review, see Heilbronner et al.,
2009). As we have noted here, paradigms developed for neuro-
physiological recordings differ substantially even from most other
animal choice studies. For example, ITIs are typically tens or hun-
dreds of seconds rather than a few seconds, and animals may
complete dozens of trials per day compared to hundreds or thou-
sands. Handling times and reward values for seeds, pellets, and
sucrose solution (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996) may also differ
drastically from those associated with drinking juice from a tube.
Because most animal studies do find risk-aversion toward gains
across a wide variety of methods, we should think of the conditions
used in macaque gambling studies as somewhat extreme.
Broadly speaking, it is clear that attitudes toward risk are
influenced by a large number of psychological factors, and that
careful manipulation of these factors can push attitudes toward
risk-aversion, risk-seeking, or neutrality. So far, the attributes of
task design used to study risk preferences in rhesus monkeys
bias them toward risk-seeking. These results highlight the impor-
tance of carefully considering the influence of task parameters
when comparing across species, and if possible of using the same
design elements. Of course, rhesus monkeys lack the ability to use
language, and their conceptual representation of large numbers
and explicit probabilities remains unclear. Given monkeys’ lack
of language, it is quite possible that there may be no fair primate
analog of standard written risk tasks in humans, just as there is no
primate analog of jokes, irony, word-naming, or any other product
of language. Thus, it may be impossible to use animals to model
certain aspects of risky decisions in humans. However, it is also
clear that humans and monkeys have similar behavior in response
to gambles in which parameters are learned, suggesting that mon-
keys may be a good model for specific types of decision-making
under uncertainty. Clearly, an important future goal will be dis-
sociating the differences between preference patterns for different
types of uncertainty (Volz and Gigerenzer, 2012).
Understanding the patterns of preferences for risk among rhe-
sus macaques is critical to neuroeconomists – scientists who use
measures of brain activity to infer the computational mechanisms
of incentive-based (i.e., economic) decisions. Rhesus macaques
are hoped to be a viable model for human economic preferences.
Although a cursory examination of human vs. macaque prefer-
ences would suggest that they are quite different (in fact, opposite),
here we have argued that similar psychological factors influence
both species. Thus, macaque models of decision-making may
accurately reflect the many cognitive biases influencing human
risk preferences. These results therefore highlight the fundamen-
tal importance of identifying and accounting for the psychological
processes behind decisions.
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